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Abstract
This study investigates the eect of inequality on economic growth in nondemocratic
regimes. We provide a model in which a self-interested ruler chooses an institution that
constrains his or her policy choice. The ruler must care about the support share of
citizens in order to keep power. Under an extractive institution, the ruler can extract
a large share of citizens' wealth, but faces a high probability of losing power because of
low public support. We show that inequality aects the ruler's trade-o between the
expropriation of citizens' wealth and his or her hold on power. Large inequality among
citizens makes the support share for the ruler inelastic with respect to his or her choice of
institution. Thus, the ruler chooses an extractive institution, which impedes investment
and growth. These results provide an explanation for the negative relationship between
inequality and growth and the negative relationship between inequality and the quality
of institutions, both of which are observed in nondemocratic countries.
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1 Introduction
Recent studies examining the sources of economic growth have shown that good institutions,
capable of securing property rights and enforcing contracts to encourage private investment,
are crucial to successful economic development (Knack and Keefer 1995, Mauro 1995, Hall
and Jones 1999, Acemoglu et al. 2001, Rodrik et al. 2004). Accordingly, the existence of
\extractive institutions,"1 under which the government has leeway to expropriate citizens'
wealth, is seen as a major obstacle to economic success for many less developed countries.
The lack of political freedom is said to be one cause of extractive institutions (Acemoglu
and Robinson 2012). However, the quality of institutions varies across nondemocratic coun-
tries, and constraints on rulers' behavior, such as binding legislatures and political parties,
can emerge in nondemocratic regimes (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006, Wright 2008, Gehlbach
and Keefer 2011). Furthermore, not all nondemocratic countries fail to attain economic
development, and there are large variations in the economic performance of such countries
(Glaeser et al. 2004, Besley and Kudamatsu 2008). For example, while some East Asian
countries achieved rapid economic growth under nondemocracy (e.g., South Korea, Singa-
pore, Indonesia, and China), many African countries fared less well under dictators who
brought about economic stagnation or decline, rather than development.
This study provides a model to examine why some nondemocratic countries succeed in
building good institutions, while others fail. We argue that income distribution is related
to the variation in institutions and economic development of nondemocratic countries. Our
theory reects the fact that successful nondemocratic regimes have a more equal income
distribution than failed nondemocratic regimes do. Figure 1 shows that per capita income
among nondemocratic countries is negatively correlated with the measure of income in-
equality.2 Moreover, as Table 1 shows, nondemocratic countries with a more equal income
distribution tend to have a better quality of government than those with an unequal income
distribution do.3 With regard to East Asian countries, Birdsall et al. (1995) highlight income
equality as a factor that led to the rapid growth of these countries.
In the model, a self-interested ruler chooses an institution that constrains his or her
1We borrow the term \extractive institutions" from Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002). Acemoglu et al.
(2002:1235) use the term to refer to institutions that \concentrate power in the hands of a small elite and
create a high risk of expropriation for the majority of the population". We also consider institutions to be
extractive when the property rights of citizens are not protected and the ruler in power can expropriate a
large share of citizens' wealth.
2Based on the Polity IV data set (Center for Systemic Peace 2012), we classify the political regime of a
country as follows. First, following Persson and Tabellini (2009), the regime of a country in a given year is
classied as a nondemocracy if the score of the polity2 variable from the Polity IV data set is less than zero,
and as a democracy otherwise. Then, we dene a country as a nondemocracy if the periods of nondemocracy
are longer than those of democracy between 1960 and 2005. The measure of inequality is the simple average
of the Gini coecients from 1960 to 2005, as provided by UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database
(UNU-WIDER 2008). Note that controlling for dierent denitions of inequality, resulting from dierent
units of observation, the denition of income, among others, does not change the results. Per-capita income
is obtained from the Penn World Table 8.0 (Feenstra et al. 2015).
3The measure of inequality is the same as Figure 1. The measures of governance quality are from the
Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al. 2011).
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Figure 1: Inequality and log of GDP per capita in 2005 among nondemocratic countries
policy choice. The institution aects the leeway for the ruler to expropriate citizens' wealth,
as well as his or her political survival, which depends on the share of citizens who support
the ruler. A ruler who chooses an extractive institution can expropriate a large share of
citizens' wealth, but faces a high probability of losing power by losing citizens' support. By
introducing institutions that restrict the ruler's conscatory behavior, the ruler can commit
to a decrease in expropriation and gain support from citizens. Hence, the ruler faces a
trade-o between expropriating citizens' wealth and holding on to power.
A similar trade-o for an autocratic ruler has been analyzed in previous studies (Acemoglu
et al. 2004, Acemoglu 2005, Besley and Kudamatsu 2008, Grossman and Noh 1994, McGuire
and Olson 1996, Overland et al. 2005, Padro i Miquel 2007, Shen 2007, Wintrobe 1990). A
common feature of the models in these studies is that the ruler chooses policies for personal
Table 1: Correlation between Gini coecients and the quality of government in 2005 among
nondemocratic countries (67 observations)
Variables Correlation Coecient p-value
Government Eectiveness -0.294 (0.016)
Regulatory Quality -0.267 (0.029)
Rule of Law -0.256 (0.036)
Control of Corruption -0.205 (0.096)
Political Stability -0.218 (0.076)
Voice and Accountability -0.200 (0.104)
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gain, but that the policy choices also aect the probability of the ruler staying in power.
The contribution of this study is to propose that income distribution aects the afore-
mentioned trade-o. We argue that a large inequality among citizens makes their support
for a ruler inelastic to the choice of the ruler. When the elasticity of the ruler's survival
probability with respect to the institutional level is low, the ruler has few incentives to build
good quality institutions. Hence, a large inequality leads to an extractive institution and,
thus, impedes investment and growth.
There is some empirical support for the viewpoint that inequality aects institutions.
Keefer and Knack (2002) nd that inequality signicantly decreases the level of property
rights protection, which, in turn, is the primary channel of the eect of inequality on growth.
You and Khagram (2005) nd that income inequality has a positive and substantial impact on
corruption. Easterly (2007) nds that inequality is negatively related to a quality measure
of institutions that reects governmental eectiveness, freedom from corruption, political
stability, and so on. Chong and Gradstein (2007) conrm that there is bidirectional causality
between income inequality and poor institutions.
As anecdotal evidence supporting the theoretical mechanism of our model, we examine
the historical background of the emergence of good quality institutions in England after the
Glorious Revolution. The explanation of our model on the relation between equality and
good quality institutions is that an equal wealth distribution yields a great number of citizens
with similar political interests, which makes the political support for a ruler responsive to
the ruler's choice of institutions. Consistent with the theory, since the 16th century, radical
economic and social changes in England made wealth distribution equal and yielded a sizable
middle class with similar political interests. This, in turn, played a critical role in forcing
the monarchy to accept constraints on royal power.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates this paper to existing
work. Section 3 builds the model. Analyzing the model, Section 4 shows the eect of
inequality on institutions and growth. Section 5 provides numerical examples to conrm
that the predictions of the model do not change under an alternative assumption about the
shape of income distribution. Section 6 provides historical evidence from England. Finally,
Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Related Literature
The relationship between inequality and economic growth has been investigated both empiri-
cally and theoretically. Findings on the empirical relationship between inequality and growth
vary across studies. Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), Perotti (1996),
and Easterly (2007) nd that inequality is negatively related to growth. However, Forbes
(2000) nds a positive impact of inequality on growth, and Banerjee and Duo (2003) show
a nonlinear impact. Moreover, Deininger and Squire (1998) reveal that asset inequality has
a negative impact on economic growth, but only in nondemocratic countries, while Barro
(2000) nds that the eects of inequality on growth are negative in poor countries, but pos-
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itive in rich countries. The negative relationship between inequality and growth has been
explained by theories as varied as credit market imperfections (Galor and Zeira 1993), re-
distributional policies as a result of majority voting (Alesina and Rodrik 1994, Persson and
Tabellini 1994), and political opposition by landowners to public support for human capital
formation (Galor et al. 2009).
We analyze how inequality aects the trade-o for a ruler between extracting citizens'
wealth and holding on to power. In this sense, our work is related to that of Acemoglu et
al. (2004) and Eicher et al. (2009).
Acemoglu et al. (2004) analyze how and when a ruler can expropriate citizens' wealth
without being ousted by revolution. In their model, democratization replaces the ruler if
producer groups cooperate to plot a revolution, while the ruler attempts to buy o a pivotal
producer group to deter intergroup cooperation. When large intergroup inequality exists,
the income of the richer producer group is high, and they attach a high value to ousting the
kleptocratic ruler. Therefore, large inequality motivates the ruler to decrease the tax rate
on the richer group. This result contrasts with our nding that a large degree of inequality
allows a ruler to impose heavy taxes on all citizens.
In the model of Eicher et al. (2009), a policymaker expropriates citizens' wealth, and the
probability of the corrupt policymaker being re-elected depends on the citizens' educational
level. The policymaker can increase both production levels and corruption rents by expanding
educational levels. However, increased educational levels force the policymaker to forgo
future corruption rents, because educated citizens can detect corruption. A large income
inequality decreases the income level of the poor, increases the necessary subsidies for the
poor to receive education, and, thereby, aects the policymaker's choice of educational levels
and economic development. In contrast to their study, we focus on the elasticity of citizens'
support as the mechanism through which income inequality aects a ruler's policy choices
and economic development.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) and Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) also consider an
environment in which the policy choices of the elite aect their hold on power, and analyze
how inequality aects their policy choices. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) provide a model
in which the elite attempt to prevent revolution by making concessions to citizens, such
as a temporary income redistribution or franchise extensions. When the income inequality
between the elite and the citizens is large, citizens have a large incentive to revolt, and
the elite in power must oer major concessions to citizens to prevent this from occurring.
Therefore, once the opportunity for revolution is realized, larger inequality leads to more
favorable policies for citizens. This conclusion contrasts with our ndings, as presented in
this paper.4 Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) propose a model in which the elite in power
choose a fraction of the poor to receive education subsidies. While educating the poor
enhances the income of the elite owing to the externality of education, it also brings about
political participation by the educated poor. Extensive political participation by the poor
4Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) argue that concessions to citizens may be avoided if the elite can choose
to repress a revolution. This is the case in which high inequality makes the cost of concessions higher than
the cost of repression.
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threatens the elite's political power and leads to income redistribution. Inequality aects
the elite's policy choice through the amount of necessary subsidies and the scale of income
redistribution.
We argue that inequality harms the protection of property rights and impedes investment
and growth. In this sense, this study is related to those that analyze the relationship between
inequality and institutions (Cervellati et al. 2008, Engerman and Sokolo 1997, Glaeser et
al. 2003, Gradstein 2007, Sokolo and Engerman 2000, Sonin 2003). Our ndings provide
new insight into the eect of inequality. When inequality is large, a ruler can build extractive
institutions, because public support for the ruler is inelastic to a change in institutions.
Finally, since government expropriation is a type of corruption, this study is related to
those on inequality and corruption (Alesina and Angeletos 2005, Eicher et al. 2009), as well
as studies on corruption and growth (Barreto 2000, Dalgic and Long 2006, De la Croix and
Delavallade 2009, Ehrlich and Lui 1999, Long and Sorger 2006, Mohtadi and Roe 2003).
3 Model
3.1 Economic Environment
We consider an overlapping generations economy where citizens live for two periods. Each
citizen has one child, and hence there is no population growth. The population of citizens in
each generation is normalized to 1. In the rst period, citizens form human capital. In the
second period, they produce consumption goods, consume them, and participate in political
activities.5
The level of human capital of each citizen depends both on his or her eort input in the
rst period of life and parental human capital. We assume the following Cobb-Douglas-type
human capital production function
hit+1 =
1

eith
1 
it ;  2 (0; 1); (1)
where hit+1 denotes the human capital level of a citizen born at period t and belonging
to dynasty i, and eit is his or her eort input. The externality of parental human capital
enables the economy to grow and reproduces the inequality of a generation in the succeeding
generation.
Dierences in human capital constitute the source of income inequality in the economy.
Let F () denote the cumulative distribution function of human capital distribution in the
initial generation, and let f() denote its probability density function. We normalize the
mean of the distribution to 1. The variance of this distribution represents the inequality in
the economy.
In the second period of life, each citizen produces consumption goods with the following
production technology:
yit = Athit; (2)
5We restrict political participation to the old generation, for simplicity. This restriction does not play
any crucial role in the following analysis.
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where yit denotes the production level of citizen i, and At denotes the productivity of the
economy.
The utility of each citizen depends on his or her consumption and on governmentally
supplied goods (hereafter, called government goods). There are n types of government
goods, and the citizens have dierent preferences for these goods. A citizen can benet from
only one type of government good. Hence, we can divide citizens into n types according to
their preferences for the government goods. Let  = f1;    ; ng denote the set of types of
government goods. Then, we can dene the type of a citizen as  2 , which shows the type
of government good that the citizen prefers. Let g() denote the quantity of government
good of type .
The probability that the type of a citizen is  is 1=n for all  2 . Thus, the population
and income distribution in each type are equivalent. The citizens' preferences for government
goods come from factors that are independent of their human capital levels. For example,
these factors include their districts of residence, religion, and ethnicity. If the type of a
citizen  2  represents the district in which the citizen resides, g() refers to the quantity
of local public goods located in the district. A citizen can benet only from the public goods
located in his or her own district. We can also interpret  as religion or ethnicity. Then, g()
refers to the quantity of religious institutions or the level of transfer targeted to a specic
ethnic group. Religious institutions are valuable only to those citizens who believe in that
religion. If a society is segregated by ethnicity, the government can formulate a policy that
is favorable for a specic ethnic group.
The utility of a type- citizen in the rst period of life is
U1(e; g()) =  e+ g();  > 0; 0 <  < 1; (3)
where  is the marginal cost of eort input and  captures the importance of government
goods. The utility of a type- citizen in the second period of life is
U2(c; g()) = c+ g(); (4)
where c denotes consumption. The consumption level of citizen i is equal to his or her after-
tax income, (1  )yi, where  denotes an income tax rate. Citizens do not discount future
utility. Therefore they invest in human capital so as to maximize U1+U2. Because citizens
take part in political processes in the second period of life, they make political choices to
maximize U2.
3.2 Political Process
In each generation, there is a set of politicians P . Politicians also live for two periods and
are active only in the second period of life. The utility of politicians depends on their
consumption and government goods. As in the case of the utility of citizens, politicians can
benet from only one type of government good and their preferences are represented by (4).
A type- politician represents the interests of type- citizens in the policy area of government
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goods provision. The probability that a randomly selected politician is type- is 1=n for all
 2 .
At the beginning of each period t, a politician is chosen randomly from the old generation's
set of politicians P and he or she occupies the seat of power. We call this politician the
incumbent ruler. Since our focus is not the selection of a ruler, but on the behavior of the
selected ruler, we simply assume the random selection of a ruler. After occupying the seat
of power, the incumbent ruler designs the institution for the period. The ruler can make
political and judicial reforms to gain unconstrained decision-making power in order to derive
large private benets. However, as we show below, such discretionary power enables the
ruler to expropriate much of citizens' wealth and causes political instability. Conversely, by
restricting the power of the government, the ruler can commit to not abusing power, which
makes the position of the ruler stable. North and Weingast (1989), analyzing the institutions
of 17th-century England, argue that a parliament constraining the ruler's behavior can make
the ruler commit credibly to giving up conscatory behavior. Wright (2008) also argues that
authoritarian regimes that need to facilitate investment create binding legislatures to commit
credibly to restricting expropriation. We represent institution quality by the upper limit of
tax rates t that the ruler can levy. No ruler can impose a tax on citizens' income that is
higher than this upper limit. A low level of t means that the property rights of citizens
are well protected. When t is high, we say that the institution is extractive. The ruler can
decrease the upper limit of tax rates by creating a well-functioning system of checks and
balances.
After observing the institution that the incumbent ruler chooses, each citizen decides
whether to support the incumbent ruler. At this stage, the incumbent ruler cannot commit
to a policy that he or she will implement after retaining power. Hence, citizens make their
political choices anticipating that the ruler will implement his or her most preferred policy.
Whether the incumbent ruler can stay in power during the period depends on the share of
citizens who support the incumbent ruler. Denoting this share of supporters as s 2 [0; 1], we
represent the probability of the incumbent ruler staying in power as
p(s) =
8<:0 0  s < 1nmin  s  1n ; 1	 1n  s  1; (5)
where  > 0 and  2 (0; 1]. The probability p(s) is nondecreasing in s.6 While we assume
that  = 1 for simplicity, we consider the case of  < 1 in Section 5.
In equilibrium, the incumbent ruler gains the support of all citizens who are of the same
type as the ruler. Therefore, the share of supporters s is not less than 1=n in equilibrium.
Equation (5) states that if the incumbent ruler cannot gain any support from citizens whose
6A similar formulation is used in Grossman and Noh (1994) and Overland et al. (2005). In both studies,
as in this paper, a ruler derives utility from own consumption and faces the probability of losing power.
The ruler's probability of retaining power depends on the expected utility of a representative producer in
Grossman and Noh (1994) and on the level of domestic capital in Overland et al. (2005). We refer to this
probability (given by (5)) as the \survival probability," as in Grossman and Noh (1994).
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preferences dier from his or her preferences, the survival probability is zero. This assump-
tion is imposed to focus on the case in which the ruler cares about support from citizens
with dierent preferences.
The survival probability of the incumbent ruler is introduced to analyze the trade-o
between the ruler's expropriation of citizens' wealth and his or her hold on power. We adopt
this setup to describe the politics in nondemocratic regimes. In nondemocratic regimes, the
political function of elections is restricted, but the public opposition of citizens can threaten
the power of rulers in a variety of ways.7 Our assumption implies that a ruler is less likely
to hold power when a larger share of citizens opposes the ruler. The negative relationship
between a ruler's survival probability and the share of opposing citizens can be interpreted
in several ways. First, when the opponents of a ruler appeal to arms, the force will be
stronger when the number of opponents is larger. Second, even if a ruler has a strong army
that can repress anti-government demonstrations, the more citizens that participate in a
demonstration, the larger is the cost of repression for the ruler. This is because a large
number of victims of repression may result in sanctions from the international community,
which can bring about the downfall of the ruler. Third, since the cost of participating in
anti-government demonstrations decreases as the number of participants increases,8 demon-
strations are more likely to take place when more citizens oppose the government. Fourth,
if a military coup needs a pretext for replacing an incumbent ruler, a low share of support
from citizens is a justiable cause.
If the incumbent ruler loses power, a new ruler is chosen from P in a random manner. We
assume that the incumbent ruler's utility is zero if he or she loses power. At the end of the
period, the ruler in power chooses a tax rate t 2 [0; t] and allocates tax revenue between
government goods and private consumption. The ruler diverts a fraction of tax revenue rt
to private consumption. In the process of misuse of tax revenue, a fraction of tax revenue
C(rt) disappears as the cost of appropriating public funds, represented by
9
C(rt) =
r1+t
1 + 
;  > 0: (6)
Let Ht denote the aggregate level of human capital and Yt = AtHt denote the aggregate
output. Then, the government budget constraint in period t is given by
rtTt +
X
2
gt() = [1  C(rt)]Tt (7)
Tt = tYt: (8)
In the case of a change in power, the productivity of the economy decreases by a fraction
 2 (0; 1). This parameter represents the cost of political instability, which may come from a
7Acemoglu and Robinson (2006:25) state that \The citizens are excluded from the political system in
nondemocracy, but they are nonetheless the majority and they can sometimes challenge the system, create
signicant social unrest and turbulence, or even pose a serious revolutionary threat."
8Kuran (1989) analyzes such a strategic complementarity in the theory of revolution.
9For example, this cost includes losses due to the inecient allocation of government posts for the ruler's
family members or the resources used to hide the misappropriation of funds.
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delay in policy decisions or disorder caused by internal conict, among other reasons. Let A
denote the productivity when the incumbent ruler stays in power, and ~A  (1  )A denote
the productivity when there is a change in power. Each citizen will support the incumbent
ruler if and only if the utility under the incumbent regime is not less than the expected
utility after a change in power.
The timing of events in the political process in period t is as follows:
1. A politician is chosen randomly from P to be the incumbent ruler.
2. The incumbent ruler chooses the upper limit of tax rates t for the period.
3. Each citizen decides whether or not to support the incumbent ruler, and the ruler's
probability of staying in power is determined.
4. If the incumbent ruler loses power, a new ruler rises to power. The ruler in power
chooses the policy (t; rt; fgt()g2).
4 Equilibrium
We briey dene the equilibrium of this model. The politico-economic equilibrium must
satisfy the following conditions.
 Optimal human capital investment : Given the expected return on human capital in-
vestment, each citizen must invest in human capital in order to maximize his or her
utility.
 Optimal policymaking by the ruler in power : The ruler in power chooses a policy to
maximize his or her utility.
 Sincere support of citizens: Comparing the utility under the incumbent's regime and
the expected utility after the change in power, each citizen sincerely chooses whether
to support the incumbent.
 Optimal institution for the incumbent ruler : Taking into account the political action of
citizens, the incumbent ruler chooses an institution in order to maximize the expected
utility.
 Perfect foresight : All citizens have the same expectation about the return on human
capital, and this expectation is met.
4.1 Human Capital Investment
First, we consider the optimal human capital investment of each citizen in the rst period of
life. The return on human capital investment depends on the political results in the second
period of life. Thus, each citizen expects political results in the next period and makes eort
input according to his or her expectation. Suppose that in period t, each citizen expects
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that the incumbent ruler in the next period will stay in power with probability p^t+1 and
will choose tax rate ^t+1, while a new ruler will choose tax rate ^
N
t+1. Then, the expected
consumption of citizen i in period t+ 1 is
E[cit+1] = [p^t+1(1  ^t+1) + (1  p^t+1)(1  ^Nt+1)(1  )]Ahit+1: (9)
Now, let us dene the expected return on human capital by R^t+1  [p^t+1(1   ^t+1) + (1  
p^t+1)(1  ^Nt+1)(1  )]A. Each citizen chooses the level of eort input to solve the following
maximization problem:
max
eit
R^t+1
1

eith
1 
it   eit: (10)
Solving this problem, we obtain
eit =
 
R^t+1

! 1
1 
hit; (11)
hit+1 =
 
R^t+1

! 
1 
hit

: (12)
Equation (11) shows that the optimal eort is increasing in the expected return on human
capital R^, which is decreasing in ^ and ^N . The eect of p^ on R^ depends on the magnitude
of the relation between (1   ^) and (1   ^N )(1   ). If (1   ^) > (1   ^N )(1   ), which
holds in equilibrium, the expectation of political stability positively aects human capital
investment. The eort input is also increasing in the level of parental human capital hit
because of the intergenerational externality of parental human capital.
Equation (12) implies a positive linear relationship between the human capital of parents
and children. This relationship makes the evolution of income distribution quite simple.
The linear relationship in (12) implies that the relative human capital of a dynasty i to the
aggregate human capital ~hit  hit=Ht is constant in all periods. Thus, ~hit follows the same
distribution as hi0 since H0 = 1.
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Lemma 1. The optimal eort input of each citizen is represented by (11). Eort input eit
in human capital production is increasing in the expected return on human capital R^ and in
parental human capital. In equilibrium, the distribution of relative human capital ~hit is the
same as that of hi0, and its c.d.f. and p.d.f. are given by F () and f() respectively.
4.2 Political Process
The level of human capital in period t is determined by the investment in the previous period.
Given the distribution of human capital, we solve the political game in period t by backward
induction. In the following, we omit the subscript t except when necessary.
10Therefore, we do not consider the dynamics of inequality, as it is beyond the scope of this study.
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4.2.1 Optimal Policy of the Ruler in Power
Assume that a type-0 2  politician is in power. The ruler chooses a policy that solves the
following problem:
max
(;r;fg()g2)
rT + g(0)
s.t. (7), (8), and  2 [0;  ]:
(13)
Clearly, it is suboptimal for the ruler to provide a positive amount of government good
of any type other than 0. Based on this fact and the government budget constraint (7),
we see that the utility of the ruler is increasing in  . Thus, the ruler sets the tax rate as 
and allocates the tax revenue between private consumption and the government good of own
type. The allocation is determined to equalize the marginal benet from the appropriation
of tax revenue to the marginal cost. A marginal increase in the appropriation rate dr
increases private consumption by Tdr but decreases the resources available to purchase the
government good g(0) by (1+C 0(r))Tdr. Therefore, the ruler chooses an allocation so that
1 = (1 + C 0(r)). The optimal policy of the ruler (t ; r

t ; fgt ()g2) is summarized in the
following lemma.11
Lemma 2. A type-0 ruler chooses policy (t ; r

t ; fgt ()g2) that satises the following:
 The tax rate is equal to the upper limit, that is, t = t.
 The rate of rent extraction rt is given by
rt =

1  

 1

 r: (14)
 The level of government good gt () is zero for any  6= 0, and gt (0) is given by
gt (
0) =

1  r 1 + 
(1 + )

T t ; (15)
where T t = 

t Yt.
4.2.2 Political Choices of Citizens
Anticipating the policy (; r; fg()g2) that the ruler in power will choose, each citizen
decides whether to support the incumbent ruler. We denote the type of the incumbent ruler
as I .
Each citizen supports the incumbent ruler if and only if the utility under the incumbent's
policy is not less than the expected utility that the citizen obtains after a change in power.
If the incumbent ruler is replaced, a new ruler seizes power, which will benet to citizens
who prefer the same type of government good as the new ruler. However, a change in power
decreases the productivity of the economy by .
11We assume an interior solution, which exists when  is suciently large.
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Since the new ruler is randomly chosen when the incumbent ruler is replaced, the prob-
ability that the type- politician becomes the new ruler is 1=n for all  2 . The policy
that a ruler will choose is given by lemma 2. Therefore, the expected utility W (hi; ) that a
type- citizen i obtains in the case of a regime change is given by
W (hi; ) = (1  ) ~Ahi + 
n

1  r 1 + 
(1 + )

 ~AH
= (1  ) ~Ahi + 	AH;
(16)
where
	  (1  )
n

1  r 1 + 
(1 + )

: (17)
The rst term in (16) is the after-tax income of citizen i, and the second term is the expected
utility from the provision of government goods by the new ruler.
A type- citizen i supports the incumbent ruler if and only if
(1  )Ahi + g()  (1  ) ~Ahi + 	AH; (18)
where g() is the government good of type  that the incumbent ruler will provide. When
the incumbent ruler keeps power, the citizens with the same preference as the incumbent ruler
receive the government good with probability one. When the incumbent ruler loses power,
they receive the government good with probability less than one and incur a productivity
loss owing to political instability. Hence, citizens with the same preference as the incumbent
ruler always support the incumbent ruler. Since the incumbent ruler cannot commit to a
policy that will be implemented at the end of the period, he or she can credibly promise to
provide the government good only to those citizens who share his or her preference.12
Those citizens whose preferences are dierent from I will support the incumbent ruler
if and only if
(1  )Ahi  (1  ) ~Ahi + 	AH: (19)
We dene  as   	=. Then, we can rewrite this condition as
~hi  
1     (); (20)
where  0 > 0 and  00 > 0.
The political choices of type- 6= I citizens are characterized by the threshold  (),
and this threshold is increasing in  . Citizens with a higher relative human capital ~hi than
 () support the incumbent ruler. Hence, rich citizens tend to support the incumbent ruler,
but poor citizenss do not. Furthermore, the number of supporters is decreasing in  . The
interpretation of this result is quite simple. On the one hand, there is a cost to citizens of a
regime change from the decrease in the return on human capital, and this cost is proportional
to the level of human capital. On the other hand, there is a benet of a regime change owing
to the provision of the own type of government good that can be realized with probability
12This formulation is based on the models of clientelism developed in Robinson and Torvik (2005) and
Robinson et al. (2006).
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1=n, and this benet is the same for all citizens, regardless of the level of human capital.
Thus, citizens with higher human capital tend to support the incumbent ruler. As the level
of  increases, the budget scale allocated to the government good rises, and the benet of
a regime change to type- 6= I citizens also increases. Furthermore, since a large level of 
means that a large share of income is levied as tax, the cost of political instability is small for
citizens. Thus, a high level of  leads to a small support share among type- 6= I citizens.
Conversely, the incumbent ruler can increase his or her political support by decreasing  . By
designing a well-functioning system of checks and balances, the incumbent ruler can make
credible promises to protect citizens' property rights.
From the above results, the equilibrium share of supporters can be written as
s() =
1
n
+
n  1
n
(1  F ( ())) : (21)
From (5) and (21), the incumbent ruler's probability of staying in power is given by
p() = min

(n  1)
n
(1  F ( ())) ; 1

: (22)
The survival probability represented in equation (22) captures the constraint faced by the
incumbent ruler in a nondemocratic regime. If the ruler chooses an institution that allows
him or her to extract a larger share of citizens' income, fewer citizens will support the ruler,
and it will become more dicult to retain political power. Equation (22) shows the important
trade-o between the incumbent ruler's expropriation and his or her hold on power.
The above results are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. In equilibrium, citizens' political choices and the resulting survival probability of
the incumbent ruler entail the following.
 All type-I citizens support the incumbent ruler.
 Type- 6= I citizens support the incumbent ruler if and only if
~hi   ();
where the threshold  () is given by (20).
 The probability of the incumbent ruler staying in power is
p() = min

(n  1)
n
(1  F ( ())) ; 1

:
4.2.3 Optimal Institution for the Incumbent Ruler
Finally, we proceed to investigate the problem of the incumbent ruler. If the incumbent ruler
loses power, his or her payo is zero. If the incumbent ruler retains power, he or she chooses
a policy as described in lemma 2. In this case, the payo of the incumbent ruler is given by
[r + (1  r   C(r)]AH. Thus the problem of the incumbent ruler is given by
max

p() : (23)
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Assuming an interior solution (p() < 1), from the rst-order condition, the optimal
institution for the incumbent ruler  satises
p0() + p() = 0: (24)
Equation (24) states that the incumbent ruler balances the trade-o between expropriation
and political survival. On the one hand, a marginal increase in  decreases the survival
probability and reduces the incumbent ruler's payo by  p0() . On the other hand, a
marginal increase in  raises tax revenue and increases the ruler's payo by p(). The
incumbent ruler will choose the institution that balances the marginal benet and marginal
cost. Equation (24) can be rewritten as
T = p(
); (25)
where
T = 1; p(
) =  p
0()
p()
=  0()
f( ())
1  F ( ()) :
The left-hand side of (25), T , is the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to  , which is
always equal to 1. That is, if the ruler increases the upper limit of tax rates by one percent,
then the tax revenue also increases by one percent. On the other hand, an increase in the tax
limit also increases the risk of being replaced. The right-hand side, p(), is the elasticity of
the survival probability with respect to  . If the ruler increases the upper limit of tax rates
by one percent, then the survival probability decreases by p percent. Since the incumbent
ruler wants to maximize the expected revenue, he or she will choose  that equalizes these
two elasticities.
Since p() is proportional to the hazard rate of the distribution of relative human capital,
f( ())=[1  F ( ())], the shape of the income distribution aects the level of institutions.
When p() is a monotonically increasing function, 
 that satises the rst-order condition
uniquely exists. Equation (25) states that the ruler chooses a high upper limit  when the
survival probability is inelastic with respect to the institutional choice of the ruler. Hence,
a downward shift of the hazard rate function increases .
Proposition 1. Assume that p() is monotonically increasing function. Then, the equilib-
rium institutional level  is uniquely determined by condition (25), and downward shift of
the hazard rate function makes the incumbent ruler choose more extractive institutions.
Proposition 1 holds under the general form of the income distribution. The hazard rate
of the income distribution aects the equilibrium institutional level through its impact on
the elasticity of the survival probability. In the following, we adopt a simple distributional
form to derive the relation between inequality and the equilibrium level of institution. In
Section 5, we will conrm that our results are still valid under the log-normal distribution,
which is commonly used as an approximation to income distribution.
We assume that the distribution of hi0 is uniform with support:
1  
2
; 1 +

2

;  2 (0; 2):
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Upper limit of tax rates
Elasticity
An increase in
Figure 2: Equilibrium quality of the chosen institution
The variance of this distribution is =12, and the parameter  represents the degree of
inequality in the economy. A large  corresponds to a high level of inequality. In this case,
the hazard rate function is given by
f( ())=[1  F ( ())] = 1
1 + 2    ()
; (26)
which is decreasing in the level of inequality .13 Hence, p() is increasing in  and decreasing
in . When the degree of inequality  is large, the survival probability is inelastic to the
change in  .
Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium institution that the incumbent ruler chooses. The
elasticity of tax revenue, T , is represented by the horizontal line and that of the survival
probability p( ; ) is the upward-sloping curve. The equilibrium institutional level is deter-
mined at the intersection of the two graphs. Since an increase in  shifts the curve of p( ; )
downward, the equilibrium degree of the extractive institution  is increasing in .
We can solve the rst-order condition with respect to  analytically, and obtain
() = 1 
s

+ 1 + 2
: (27)
Equation (27) shows that () is indeed increasing in .
Proposition 2. The larger the degree of inequality , the more extractive is the institution
chosen by the incumbent ruler.
The following illustrates the intuition behind the mechanism through which inequality
aects the ruler's institutional choice. By dierentiating the survival probability p with
13Note that it is suboptimal for the incumbent ruler to choose an institution such that  () > 1 + =2
and  () < 1   =2. If  () > 1 + =2, the survival probability and payo of the ruler will be zero. If
 () < 1  =2, the ruler can increase  without decreasing his or her survival probability.
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Figure 3: Marginal eects of  on p( ; )
respect to  , we obtain
@p
@
( ; ) =  (n  1)
n
 0()

: (28)
The derivative @p( ; )=@ is negative and increasing in . This means that the negative
impact of  on the survival probability p( ; ) is small when inequality is large. We can
illustrate this result using Figure 3. Suppose that there are two economies, namely an equal
economy and an unequal economy. The distribution of relative human capital ~hi in the
unequal economy is more dispersed, with a small density of distribution. Thus, the political
preferences of citizens are more dispersed in the unequal economy. In Figure 3, 1=0 denotes
the density of the distribution in the equal economy, and 1= is the density in the unequal
economy. Since the threshold  () is independent of the distribution of ~hi, as shown in (20),
the same threshold divides the political behavior of citizens in both economies. However,
a change in the incumbent ruler's choice of institution has dierent impacts on his or her
survival probability in the two economies. Suppose that the incumbent ruler decreases the
upper limit of tax rates from  to  0. This change increases the support for the ruler,
but the increase is lower in the unequal economy than it is in the equal economy. This is
because the density of the distribution of ~hi is low in the unequal economy. In the unequal
economy, where citizens' political preferences are dispersed, few citizens share similar political
preferences. Thus, in the face of a change in institution, few citizens change their political
attitude. Hence, when inequality is large, a marginal decrease in  has a small impact on
the incumbent ruler's survival probability.14 In this situation, the ruler has few incentives
to build good quality institutions.
Since we assume an interior solution, the equilibrium survival probability of the incum-
14This mechanism is similar to the probabilistic voting model (Lindbeck and Weibull 1987; Dixit and
Londregan 1996; Persson and Tabellini 2000). In the probabilistic voting model, the less dispersed the
distribution of citizens' political preferences, the more the politicians must be concerned about their welfare
since the share of supporters is more responsive to the policy choice.
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bent ruler is given by15
p()  p((); ) = (n  1)
n
0@1 + 
2
+   
s
1 +
1 + 2

1A : (29)
The eect of inequality on political stability is ambiguous. An increase in  leads to a more
extractive institution (i.e., higher ) and decreases the share of support (institutional eect).
In addition, an increase in  transforms the distribution of relative human capital. Keeping
the threshold  () xed, an increase in  changes the share of citizens whose relative human
capital is greater than  (), thus, changing the share of support (distributional eect). This
eect is negative when  () < 1, but is positive when  () > 1. Thus, if  (())  1,
the eect of  on p() is negative. Otherwise, the sign of the eect is determined by the
magnitude of the relation between these two opposing eects. The following proposition
indicates the U-shaped relationship between inequality and political stability.
Proposition 3. The eects of inequality on political stability depend on the institutional
and distributional eects. Inequality will decrease political stability if and only if
1 + p

>
1 + + 4q
1 + + 2
: (30)
Since the right-hand side of (30) is increasing in , the relationship between inequality and
political stability is non-monotonic and U-shaped.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is as follows. Consider the population share of citizens
whose relative human capital is higher than a certain threshold level. If the threshold is the
average, the population share is the same in the equal economy and the unequal economy,
because the distribution is now uniform. If the threshold is higher than the average, the
population share is larger in the unequal economy, and the dierence increases with the
threshold level. Hence the distributional eect is strong when the threshold  (()) is high.
If the threshold  (()) is equal to or less than 1, both the institutional and the distri-
butional eects are negative, and political stability is decreasing in . When the threshold
 (()) is higher than 1 but low enough, the institutional eect dominates the distributional
eect, and thus, an increase in inequality reduces political stability.16 A further increase in
inequality increases () and  (()). Then, the distributional eect becomes important
and dominates the institutional eect. In this situation, an increase in inequality brings
about more political stability.
15To ensure the interior solution p((); ) < 1, the parameter  must be suciently small. Note that
p((); ) < 1 when  = 1.
16Alesina and Perotti (1996) nd that inequality is negatively related with political stability.
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4.3 Equilibrium Growth Rate and Inequality
In the previous subsection, we showed that inequality yields an extractive institution. Now,
we investigate the eects of inequality on economic growth.
The equilibrium return on human capital is
R() = (1  ())[p() + (1  p())(1  )]A: (31)
Equation (31) shows that R() is decreasing in () and increasing in p(). Since political
change leads to a decrease in productivity, a high probability of political change would
decrease the return.
The eects of inequality on the return of human capital R() are decomposed into two
eects. First, an increase in  leads to a more extractive institution (i.e., a higher ()),
and decreases R(). Second, an increase in  aects the political stability p((); ), and
thereby, aects R(). As shown in Proposition 3, this eect of  on p((); ) is ambiguous.
However, as the following lemma states, the overall eects of  on R() are always negative.
Lemma 4. The eects of inequality  on the equilibrium return of human capital R() are
negative.
Proof. See Appendix B.
In equilibrium, citizens predict the future political results correctly, and therefore, R^ =
R. Then, from (12), the growth rate of the aggregate human capital is given by
Ht+1
Ht
=
1


R

 
1 
: (32)
The growth rate of aggregate human capital depends positively on R().
The equilibrium aggregate output is given by
Y t =
8<:AHt with probability p();(1  )AHt with probability 1  p(): (33)
Therefore, the expected level of output E(Y t ) is
E(Y t ) = (1  (1  p))AHt : (34)
Let us dene the average growth rate of output between periods t and t + 1 such that
E(Y t+1)=E(Y

t ). Then, the average growth rate of output is equal to the growth rate of
aggregate human capital and is increasing in R(). Thus, we derive the following proposition
on the eects of inequality on the growth rate.
Proposition 4. The growth rate of human capital and the average growth rate of output
E(Y t+1)=E(Y

t ) are decreasing in inequality .
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Figure 4: Log-normal distributions
5 Numerical Examples
In the previous section, we assumed that the distribution of relative human capital is uniform
in order to analyze the model in a simple way. However, the assumption of a uniform
distribution may be unrealistic, leading to doubts about whether our results hold if we
assume a more realistic distribution. In order to answer this question, this section provides
numerical examples with a more realistic distribution of relative human capital.
We suppose that the distribution of relative human capital hit=Ht follows a log-normal
distribution, which is commonly used as an approximation to income distribution.17 In the
model, the relative human capital coincides with the relative income yit=Yt. Furthermore,
when the relative income follows a log-normal distribution, the shape of the distribution of
income yi is the same as the distribution of yi=Y , except for the mean. The mean of the
distribution of relative human capital is always 1, because the population in each generation
is normalized to 1. Here, we examine dierent variances in the range where the corresponding
Gini coecients are close to the actual values.18
Figure 4 shows the graphs of hazard rates of relative human capital distributions. The
distributions have the same mean, but dierent dispersions. The solid line represents the
hazard rates in an economy with a Gini coecient of 0.30, which is close to the coecients
in East Asian countries.19 The dotted line represents the hazard rates of the more unequal
economy, where the Gini coecient is 0.50. This is close to the coecients in Latin American
countries.20 The dashed line represents the hazard rates of the economy with an intermediate
level of inequality.
As Figure 4 clearly shows, a more equal income distribution will have larger hazard rates
17Note that the distribution of relative human capital remains unchanged through generations regardless
of the shape of distribution in the initial period.
18We provide more detailed explanations in Appendix C.
19According to Deininger and Squire (1996), the average Gini coecient is 0.342 in South Korea (1953-
1988), 0.335 in Indonesia (1964-1993 ), 0.296 in Taiwan (1964-1993), and 0.401 in Singapore (1973-1989).
20Deiniger and Squire (1996) report that the mean of Gini coecients is 0.573 in Brazil(1960-1989), 0.518
in Chile (1968-1994), 0.515 in Columbia (1970-1991), and 0.480 in Peru (1971-1994).
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in a considerable part of the range. Since the main mechanism of our model is driven by the
link between large inequality and small hazard rates of relative human capital distribution,
our basic results will hold in many cases, even if we assume a log-normal distribution.
Although the hazard rate of an equal economy is lower than that of an unequal economy
in the range where relative income is small, we do not consider this to be a serious problem in
terms of our results. The equilibrium institutional level is aected by the level of the hazard
rate around the relative income of the threshold citizen. It is natural to think that autocratic
rulers need less political support than democratic leaders. Hence, the relative income of the
threshold citizen would be greater than the average level. Figure 4 shows that the range
where the negative relationship between inequality and the hazard rate holds includes the
mean.
Before a detailed specication, we must emphasize the following. Since our model is not
intended for a quantitative analysis, and it is dicult to nd plausible empirical targets
for some parameters, we do not oer quantitative predictions. Our focus is on whether the
mechanism of the model is robust to the alternative shape of the income distribution. Thus,
we focus on the direction in which an increase in inequality could change the tax rate and
political stability. Assuming log-normal distribution, we will numerically show that greater
inequality leads to a higher tax rate (a more extractive institution) and to lower support
share.
We specify the values of the model's parameters as plausibly as possible. We must specify
three parameters of the model in order to calculate the numerical values of the equilibrium
tax rate and the equilibrium share of supporters.21 It is sucient to calculate the share of
supporters in order to identify the direction in which an increase in inequality changes the
survival probability. The benchmark parameters are shown in Table 2. Based on existing
empirical research, we set the productivity loss from political instability, , as 5%. This is
the average output loss from a political crisis in poor countries, as estimated by Cerra and
Saxena (2008).
With regard to the remaining two parameters, we examine several values, because we
have little empirical evidence. We can interpret the expected gain of political turnover 	
as the degree of political conict over the public expenditure allocation. In the benchmark
model, we set 	 = 0:25, which makes the equilibrium tax rate around 18%. Tanzi and
Zee (2000) report that the average share of tax revenue to GDP in developing countries is
about 18%. We also examine cases where 	 = 0:20 and 	 = 0:33. Parameter  reects the
elasticity of the survival probability with respect to the share of supporters. We set  = 0:5
in the benchmark, but also examine the cases where  = 0:33 and  = 0:66.
Since the upper limit of the tax rate  is always binding, the equilibrium tax rate is
a solution of the rst-order condition (25). In Figure 5, which corresponds to Figure 2 in
Section 4, we plot the values of the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to  , which is
always equal to one, and the values of the elasticity of survival probability with respect to 
21We do not calculate the equilibrium survival probability since it would need to specify the values of n
and .
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Parameter Value Description
 0.05 Productivity loss of political instability
	 0.25 Expected gain of political turnover
 0.5 Parameter of political stability function
Table 2: Value of parameters
under the benchmark parameter values. We examine three economies with Gini coecients
of 0.30, 0.40, and 0.50, respectively. Figure 5 is consistent with the main results of the model
that the survival probability is more elastic to institutional changes in more equal economies,
and that the equilibrium tax rate is lower in these economies. Thus, this numerical example
suggests that the main result of our model does not change in the case of a log-normal
distribution.
In Figure 6, we plot the equilibrium tax rates and the equilibrium share of supporters for
various values of 	. Although the expected gain of political turnover 	 aects the levels of
the tax rate and the share of supporters, the qualitative relationship between these variables
and inequality does not change. An increase in inequality increases the tax rate and reduces
the share of supporters. Similarly, Figure 7 examines dierent values of . Figure 7 indicates
the quantitative importance of the elasticity of survival probability with respect to support
share for the choice of the incumbent ruler. When the survival probability is elastic to the
support share, the ruler would avoid choosing a high  and, thus, gain more support from the
citizens. However, the positive relationship between inequality and the equilibrium tax rate
and the negative relationship between inequality and the equilibrium support share would
hold irrespective of the value of .
Our quantitative exercise shows that the qualitative predictions of the model do not
change even though we assume a log-normal distribution. This is because the hazard rate of
the relative human capital distribution is decreasing in inequality in most of the range, as
shown in Figure 4.
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6 A Historical Example
This section briey reviews the historical background of the emergence of good quality
institutions in 17th-century England as supportive anecdotal evidence of the theoretical
mechanism described in the previous sections. The main message of the theory is that
having a large number of citizens with similar political interests, yielded by an equal income
distribution, makes the political support for a ruler responsive to a change in institutions. In
this situation, the ruler chooses good quality institutions. Consistent with the theory, since
the 16th century, radical economic and social changes in England created a sizable middle
class with similar political interests. This social class was critical in building the institutions
that constrained the power of the monarchy.
Two important events are noteworthy in terms of the radical change in the social class
in England since the 16th century. The rst is England Reformation. As a result of the
confrontation between the Pope and Henry VIII, which was caused by the problem of a royal
divorce, Henry VIII passed the Act of Supremacy and established the Church of England in
1534. The Catholic churches were dissolved and their assets and lands were conscated by
the government. Since the government faced a chronic scal decit, a large part of conscated
land was sold to compensate for this decit. The rapid increase in the supply of land made
the land market active. Hill (1969:64) argues that, \In the century and a quarter after 1530
land was more freely bought and sold in England than ever before. The Reformation threw
monastic and chantry lands on the market. . . . Meanwhile monastic lands had been sold,
and crown lands to the value of $2 1/4 million between 1558 and 1640."
The active land market increased the mobility of land and caused a massive reallocation of
land resources from landlords to more ecient land managers. The gentry, a newly emerging
class with a talent for entrepreneurial activities, occupied a substantial part of the land at the
end of the 16th century. On the other hand, the sharp rise in prices in Europe, the so-called
Price Revolution, reduced the real value of xed land rent. The traditional management
system of manors came to a crisis because of these changes, and many aristocrats who were
not able to adapt to these changes had major diculties. 22 Hill (1969:61-62) states that,
\Those with xed incomes were in diculties{ e.g. landlords who had let their lands on long
leases, though when the leases fell in they would get a windfall ne, a loan in advance."
As an inevitable consequence, the reallocation of land resources had a signicant inuence
on wealth distribution. Overall, it redistributed land resources from the rich landlords to
the middle-class gentry. On the impact of the active land market on wealth distribution,
Tawney (1941:33-34) argues that:
\the tendency of an active land-market was, on the whole, to increase the number
of medium-sized properties, while diminishing that of the largest. . . . as the
number of great properties was levelled down, and that of properties of moderate
size levelled up, the upper ranges of English society came to resemble less a chain
of high peaks than an undulating table-land."
22Stone (1965) closely examines the situations and causes of the crises faced by the aristocrats.
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The second important event was the expansion in Atlantic trade since the 16th century.
Trade with North America and the West Indies brought economic advancement in Eng-
land. Various manufacturing industries emerged in this period, such as cloth manufacturing,
mining, glassware, pottery, and shipbuilding. Furthermore, economic development caused
urban development in London and other cities, which became major bases of manufacturing
industries and the Atlantic trade (Pincus 2009, chap. 3).
The development in trade and industries changed the distribution of wealth and power,
and raised the economic and political status of merchants. Pincus and Robinson (2011:18)
state that, \The newly dynamic economy shifted the social balance. Manufacturers, urban
dwellers, and colonial traders became much more wealthy. Most thought that as England
became a nation of tradesmen and shopkeepers, there had been a shift of political power."
As a result, the common people became a counterbalance to the king (Tawney 1941, Pincus
and Robinson 2011).
The wealth of the gentry and the merchants raised their political power and led to the
emergence of institutions that constrained the king's conscatory behavior and protected
citizens' property rights.23 Acemoglu et al. (2005a:393) state that:
\By the seventeenth century, the growing prosperity of the merchants and the
gentry, based both on internal and overseas, especially Atlantic, trade, enabled
them to eld military forces capable of defeating the king. This de facto power
overcame the Stuart monarchs in the Civil War and Glorious Revolution, and
led to a change in political institutions that stripped the king of much of his
previous power over policy. These changes in the distribution of political power
led to major changes in economic institutions, strengthening the property rights
of both land and capital owners and spurred a process of nancial and commercial
expansion."
The social classes created by the reallocation of land and Atlantic trade were not only
powerful, but also sizable and broad. As Stone (1966:29) points out, these economic changes
led to \a greater equality among the upper classes". Stone (1966:29) further states that
\rstly the wealth and power of the greater gentry increased relative to those of the aristoc-
racy; and secondly members of the trades and professions rose in wealth, numbers and social
status relative to the landed classes." Stone (1964:71) also states that the economic changes
since the 16th century caused an income redistribution \at the expense of the topmost and
bottommost layers of the social pyramid", and that \[a]bsolutely and relatively, the mid-
dle segment of society was increasing in numbers and in wealth". Acemoglu and Robinson
(2012:210) point out the broad opposition against the king as a critical factor leading to the
emergence of good quality institutions in England:
23Acemoglu et al. (2005b) provide empirical evidence that the expansion of Atlantic trade encouraged
economic growth in the Western world. They argue that in countries with better access to Atlantic trade,
the large prot they accrued enhanced the political power of merchant classes, which brought about an
institutional change to protect property rights.
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\Perhaps most critically, the emergence and empowerment of diverse interests{
ranging from the gentry, a class of commercial farmers that had emerged in the
Tudor period, to dierent types of manufacturers to Atlantic traders{meant that
the coalition against Stuart absolutism was not only strong but also broad."
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue that the broad opposition to the monarchy contributed
to the emergence of good quality institutions because it prevented the winning opposition
from creating institutions for a specic interest.
The model proposed in this study sheds light on another aspect of the broad opposition
against the Stuarts. The central point of the model is that large numbers of citizens with
similar interests, yielded by an equal wealth distribution, makes the political support for
a ruler responsive to the change of constraints on a ruler's conscatory behavior. In this
situation, the ruler chooses good quality institutions. As we have noted, the economic
changes since the 16th century yielded an equal wealth distribution and a large middle class,
and this new social class formed a powerful force opposing the monarchy. The theoretical
mechanism of this paper is consistent with these facts, and provides an explanation as to
why good quality institutions emerged in 17th-century England.
As Pincus and Robinson (2011) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) note, William III
readily accepted the decrease in the king's power and the increase in parliament's power after
the Glorious Revolution. However, we cannot attribute the reason for the king's behavior to
his personality. As Pincus and Robinson (2011:20-21) note:
\William was no closet republican. In fact, he had come to come to power in
the United Provinces in 1672 after a wave of popular anti-republican riots. He
emerged as the Stadholder, or political leader of the United Provinces, only after
the republican leaders John and Cornelius De Witt had been publicly lynched
by Orangist (monarchist) mobs. William was, like his uncle James II, a Stuart
with every reason to want a strong monarchy."
The model proposed in this study indicates that the responsiveness of political support for
the king to his institutional choice was the reason why William accepted the constraints on
his power.
7 Conclusion
This study provides a model to show that large inequality leads to extractive institutions
and impedes economic growth. In the model, a ruler chooses an institution that constrains
his or her policy choice. The ruler who chooses an extractive institution can expropriate a
large share of citizens' wealth, but faces a high probability of losing power owing to a lack
of citizen support. Hence, the ruler faces a trade-o between expropriating citizens' wealth
and holding on to power. We argue that a large inequality among citizens makes the ruler's
survival probability inelastic to his or her choice. In this situation, the ruler has a large
incentive to build an extractive institution, which impedes investment and growth.
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Our results are based on the negative relationship between inequality and the hazard
rates of the income distribution. This relationship holds to a considerable extent under a
log-normal distribution, which is one of standard approximations to income distribution.
Here, we provide numerical examples to illustrate that our results obtained under a uniform
income distribution also hold under a log-normal distribution.
These results provide an explanation for the negative relationship between inequality and
growth observed in nondemocratic countries. The prediction of the model that economic
inequality is negatively related with the quality of institutions is also consistent with the
ndings of recent empirical studies. Moreover, the history of England in the 16th-17th
centuries is consistent with the theory. The radical economic and social changes in England
created a large middle class, which was critical to building the institutions that constrained
the power of monarchy.
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Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 3
We derive condition (30) for p() to be decreasing in . Since
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By arranging (A3), we get (30).
B. Proof of Lemma 4
We rewrite the equilibrium return on human capital (31) as
R() = [p()(1  ()) + (1  p())(1  ())(1  )]A
= Q()A+ (1  ())(1  )A;
(B1)
where Q() is given by
Q() = (1  ())p(): (B2)
We show that Q() is decreasing in , which implies that R() is also decreasing in  since
(1  ())(1  )A is decreasing in .
From (27), (29), and (B2), we have
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By dierentiating (B3), we have
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(B4) implies that Q0() < 0 if and only if
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We show that (B5) holds for any  > 0. Now, we dene  () by
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Since  (0) = 1 +  p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 () > 0 for all  > 0. This means that Q0() < 0 for all  > 0, i.e., Q() is decreasing in .
C. Procedure of Numerical Analysis
We assume that relative human capital ~hi follows the log-normal distribution. For numerical
analysis, we must choose the parameters (; ) of the density function of the log-normal
distribution, which is given by
f(x) =
1p
2x
e 
(ln x )2
22 : (C1)
The distribution function is
F (x) = 

lnx  


; (C2)
where  is the distribution function of the standard normal distribution. The corresponding
mean and variance are given by
E(x) = e+
2
2 ; V (x) = e2+
2
(e
2   1):
Since the mean of relative human capital is always equal to one, we must choose parameters
so that E(x) = 1. Therefore, we choose  so as to satisfy
 =  
2
2
: (C3)
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We identify parameter  from the target Gini coecients. It is known that the Gini
coecient under the log-normal distribution depends only on  and is given by
G = 2

p
2

  1: (C4)
From (C3) and (C4), we can choose (; ) uniquely if we have the target value of Gini
coecients, G.
In the case of log-normal distribution, the rst-order condition (25) is replaced by
1 =
f( (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where the second equality comes from (C2) and (C3). From (C1) and (C5), we can calculate
the equilibrium institution, which is equal to the equilibrium tax rate, and the equilibrium
share of supporters.
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